Criticism
Volume 53 | Issue 2

2011

With Hegel Beyond Hegel
Slavoj Žižek
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, slavoj.zizek@guest.arnes.si

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Žižek, Slavoj (2011) "With Hegel Beyond Hegel," Criticism: Vol. 53: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol53/iss2/6

Article 6

With Hegel
Beyond Hegel
Slavoj Žižek
The Hegel Variations: “On the
Phenomenology of the Spirit” by
Fredric Jameson. London:
Verso, 2010. pp. 144. $24.95 cloth.

The essayistic nature of Fredric Jameson’s short new book on
G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit should not blind us to the
fact that the book offers a systematic interpretation of the entire
inner structure of Hegel’s first
masterpiece. Although The Hegel
Variations comes from someone for
whom reading Hegel is like eating
daily bread, the book is readable
as an introduction to Hegel while
simultaneously providing precise
interpretive hints worthy of the
greatest Hegel specialists. In this
review, I limit myself to four variations of my own, to four interventions into the book’s key topics:
Hegel and the critique of capitalism,
the circle of positing presuppositions, Understanding and Reason,
and the eventual limits of Hegel. Of
course, the critical nature of some
of my remarks is based on my great
admiration of Jameson’s work and
on a shared solidarity in our struggle
for the Hegelian legacy in Marxism. One should remember here the
proverb that says only the highest
peaks are struck by lightning.
I
Jameson is right to draw attention
to the fact that, “despite his familiarity with Adam Smith and emergent economic doctrine, Hegel’s
conception of work and labor—I
have specifically characterized it
as a handicraft ideology—betrays
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no anticipation of the originalities of industrial production or the
factory system”—in short, Hegel’s
analyses of work and production
cannot be “transferred to the new
industrial situation” (68). There is a
series of interconnected reasons for
this limitation, all grounded in the
constraints of historical experience
at Hegel’s disposal. First, Hegel’s
notion of industrial revolution was
the Adam Smith–type manufacture where the work process is
still that of combined individuals
using tools, and not yet the factory
in which the machinery sets the
rhythm and individual workers are
reduced de facto to organs serving
the machinery, to its appendices.
Second, Hegel could not yet
imagine the way abstraction rules
in developed capitalism: when Karl
Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of capital, whose
solipsistic path of self-fecundation
reaches its apogee in today’s metareflexive speculations on futures, it
is far too simplistic to claim that
the specter of this self-engendering
monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological
abstraction, and that one should
never forget that, behind this abstraction, are real people and natural
objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital’s circulation is based and on which it feeds
like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this “abstraction” is not
only in our (financial speculator’s)

misperception of social reality, but
that it is “real” in the precise sense
of determining the structure of the
very material social processes: the
fate of whole strata of population
and sometimes of entire countries
can be decided by the solipsistic
speculative dance of capital, which
pursues its goal of profitability in a
blessed indifference with regard to
how its movement will affect social
reality. Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than
the direct precapitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no
longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” intentions,
but is purely “objective,” systemic,
anonymous. Here we encounter the
Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: reality is the social
reality of the actual people involved
in interaction and in the productive
processes, whereas the Real is the inexorable “abstract” spectral logic of
capital that determines what occurs
in social reality. This gap is palpable
in the way the economic situation of
a country is considered to be good
and stable by the international financial experts even when the large
majority of people are living worse
than before. Reality doesn’t matter;
what matters is the situation of capital. . . . And, again, is this not more
true today than ever? Do phenomena usually designated as those of
virtual capitalism (future trades and
similar abstract financial speculations) not point toward the reign
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of real abstraction at its purest and
much more radical than in Marx’s
time? In short, the highest form of
ideology does not reside in getting
caught up in ideological spectrality, ignoring its foundation in real
people and their relations, but precisely in overlooking this Real of
spectrality and in pretending to address directly real people with their
real worries. Visitors to the London
Stock Exchange receive a free leaflet explaining that the stock market
is not about some mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and
their products—this is ideology at
its purest.
Here, in the analysis of the universe of capital, one should not only
project Hegel toward Marx, but
Marx himself should be radicalized: it is only today, in the postindustrial form of global capitalism,
that, to put it in Hegelian terms,
really existing capitalism reaches
the level of its notion: perhaps, one
should follow again Marx’s old
anti-evolutionist motto (incidentally, taken from Hegel) that the
anatomy of man provides the key
for the anatomy of a monkey; that
is, to deploy the inherent notional
structure of a social formation, one
must start with its most developed
form.
Capital is money that is no
longer merely wealth, its universal embodiment, but value that,
through its circulation, generates
more value—value that mediates or posits itself, retroactively
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positing its own presuppositions.
First, money appears as a mere
means of exchanging commodities:
instead of the endless bartering,
one first exchanges one’s product
for the universal equivalent of all
commodities, which can then be
exchanged for any commodity that
one may need. Then, once the circulation of capital is set in motion,
the relationship is inverted, with the
means turning into an end in itself;
that is, the very passage through the
“material” domain of use values (the
production of commodities that satisfy individuals’ particular needs)
is posited as a moment of what is
substantially the self-movement of
capital itself. From that moment
onward, the true aim is no longer the satisfaction of individuals’
needs, but simply more money, the
endless repeating of the circulation
as such. . . . This arcane circular
movement of self-positing is then
equated with the central Christian
tenet of the identity of God the Father and his Son, of the Immaculate
Conception by means of which the
single father directly (without a
female spouse) begets his only son
and thus forms what is arguably
the ultimate single-parent family.
Is then capital the true Subject/
Substance? Yes and no. For Marx,
this self-engendering circular move
ment is—to put it in Freudian
terms—precisely the capitalist unconscious fantasy that parasitizes
the proletariat as pure substanceless
subjectivity; for this reason, capital’s
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speculative self-generating dance
has a limit and brings about the
conditions of its own collapse. Our
everyday experience tells us that the
ultimate goal of capital’s circulation
is the satisfaction of human needs,
that capital is just a means to attain
this satisfaction more efficiently.
Then there is the notion of capital as a self-engendering monster.
In actuality, however, capital does
not engender itself but exploits the
worker’s surplus value. There is
thus a necessary third level to be
added to the simple opposition of
subjective experience (of capital as
a simple means of efficiently satisfying people’s needs) and objective
social reality (of exploitation): the
objective deception, the disavowed
unconscious fantasy (of the mysterious self-generating circular
movement of capital), which is the
truth (although not the reality) of the
capitalist process. Again, to quote
Jacques Lacan, truth is structured
like fiction: the only way to formulate the truth of capital is to present this fiction of its “immaculate”
self-generating movement. And
this insight also enables us to locate
the weakness of Jacques Derrida’s
“deconstructionist” appropriation
of Marx’s analysis of capitalism:
although it emphasizes the endless
process of deferral that characterizes this movement, as well as its
fundamental inconclusiveness, its
self-blockade, the deconstructionist retelling still describes the fantasy of capital—it describes what

individuals believe, although they
don’t know it.
What all this means is that the
urgent task of the economic analysis today is, again, to repeat Marx’s
critique of political economy without succumbing to the temptation
of the multitude of the ideologies
of postindustrial societies. The
key change concerns the status of
private property: the ultimate element of power and control is no
longer the last link in the chain
of investments, the firm or individual who really owns the means
of production. The ideal capitalist
today functions in a wholly different way: investing borrowed
money, “actually owning” nothing, even indebted, but nonetheless
controlling things. A corporation
is owned by another corporation,
which is again borrowing money
from banks, which may ultimately
manipulate money owned by ordinary people like ourselves. With
Microsoft’s Bill Gates, the private
property of the means of production becomes meaningless, at least
in the standard meaning of the
private property. The paradox
of this virtualization of capitalism is ultimately the same as that
of the electron in elementary particle physics. The mass of each element in our reality is composed
of its mass at rest plus the surplus
provided by the acceleration of its
movement; however, an electron’s
mass at rest is zero; its mass consists only of the surplus generated
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by the acceleration of its movement, as though we are dealing
with a nothing that acquires some
deceptive substance only by magically spinning itself into an excess
of itself. Do today’s virtual capitalists not function in a homologous
way? Their net value is zero; they
directly operate with just the surplus, borrowing from the future.
The irony is not difficult to miss
here: the fact that Marx needed
Hegel to formulate the logic of
capital (the crucial breakthrough in
Marx’s work occurred in the mid1850s, when, after the failure of the
1848 revolutions, he started to read
Hegel’s Logic again) means that
what Hegel wasn’t able to see was
not some post-Hegelian or postidealist reality of the properly Hegelian aspect of capitalist economy.
Here, paradoxically, Hegel was not
idealist enough; that is, what he did
not see was the properly speculative
content of the capitalist speculative economy, the way the financial
capital functions as a purely virtual
notion processing “real people.”
Last but not least, the third
critical point concerns the properly
modern capitalist class struggle
in its difference from traditional
caste and feudal hierarchies: since
Hegel’s notion of domination was
limited to traditional struggle between master and servant, what he
couldn’t envisage was a relationship of domination that persists in
a postrevolutionary situation (revolution, of course, refers here to the
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bourgeois revolution doing away
with traditional privileges) where
all individuals recognize one another as autonomous free subjects.
This prodigious social leveling of a
modern democracy
certainly does not exclude
the emergence of wealth and
of profound distinctions between rich and poor, even in
the socialist countries. Nor
is it in any way to be understood as the end of classes in
their economic sense: there
are still workers and managers in these societies, there
are still profit and exploitation, reserve armies of the
unemployed, and so on and
so forth. But the new cultural equality . . . is infused
with a powerful hatred of
hierarchy and special privileges and with a passionate
resentment of caste distinctions and inherited cultural
superiority. It is permitted
to be wealthy, so long as
the rich man is as vulgar as
everyone else. (101)
This is a situation that, one might
add, opens up the unexpected possibility of a genuinely proletarian
reappropriation of the so-called
high culture. All three of these cases
seem to call for a Hegelian analysis:
laborers reduced to an appendix of
machinery; reality; and a hierarchy persisting in the very form of
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“plebeianization”—paradoxical reversals that seem to give body to all
the twists of the most sophisticated
dialectic.
II
Jameson characterizes Understanding (Verstand), the “common-sense
empirical thinking of externality,
formed in the experience of solid
objects and obedient to the law of
non-contradiction” (119), as a kind
of spontaneous ideology of our
daily lives, of our immediate experience of reality. As such, it is not
merely a historical phenomenon
to be dissolved through dialectical
critique and the practical change
of relations that engender it, but
a permanent, transhistorical, fixture of our everyday reality. True,
Reason (Vernunft) “has the task of
transforming the necessary errors
of Verstand into new and dialectical kinds of truths” (119), but this
transformation leaves intact the
everyday efficiency of Understanding, its formative role in our ordinary experience. All Reason can
do is a kind of Kantian critical delimitation of the proper sphere of
Understanding; that is, it only can
makes us aware of how, in our daily
lives, we are victims of necessary
(transcendental) illusions. Underlying this reading of the opposition
of Reason and Understanding is a
profoundly non-Marxian notion of
ideology (or, rather, a profoundly

non-Marxian split of this notion)
probably taken from Louis Althusser (and, maybe, Lacan). In a
Kantian mode, Jameson seems to
imply two modes of ideology: a historical one (forms linked to specific
historical conditions that disappear
when these conditions are abolished, like traditional patriarchy)
and an a priori transcendental one
(a kind of spontaneous tendency
to identitarian thinking, to reification, etc., that is cosubstantial with
language as such, and that, for this
reason, can be assimilated to the illusion of the big Other as the “subject supposed to know”).
Closely linked to this notion of
ideology is Jameson’s (rarely noticed, but all the more persistent)
motif of the unsayable, of things better left unsaid. For example, in his
review of my Parallax View (2006)
in the London Review of Books, his
argument against the notion of
parallax is that, as the name for the
most elementary split/diffraction,
it endeavors to name something
that is better left unnamed. In a
similar way, Jameson subscribes to
the Kantian tendency of (some of)
today’s brain scientists about the a
priori structural unknowability of
consciousness:
[W]hat Hegel’s contemporaries called the not-I is that
which consciousness is conscious as its other, and not any
absence of consciousness itself, something inconceivable
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except as a kind of sciencefictional picture-thinking, a
kind of thought of otherness.
But it is hard to understand
how we could know something without knowing what
its absence entails: and it may
well be, as Colin McGinn
argues, that consciousness
is one of those philosophical
problems which human beings are structurally unfit to
solve; and that in that sense
Kant’s was the right position to take: that, although
its existence is as certain as
the Cartesian cogito, consciousness must also remain
perpetually unknowable as a
thing-in-itself. (32)
The least one can say about these
lines is that they are profoundly
non-Hegelian, even taking into account Jameson’s unexpected dialectical point: since an element can be
properly grasped only through its
difference to its opposite, and since
the I’s opposite—the not-I—is as
inaccessible to the I as it is in-itself,
the consequence of the unknowability of the not-I as it is in-itself,
independently of the I, is the unknowability of consciousness (the
I) itself as it is in-itself. The standard solipsist-empiricist point that
the subject can only know itself, its
sensations, is thus proven wrong: if
the not-I is unknowable, the I itself
suffers the same lot. The question
to be raised here is this: Is this circle
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inescapable? Are we caught in it
to the end, so that every speculation about the outside is always
already a retroactive fantasy from
the standpoint inside, or, as Hegel
would have put it, is every presupposition already posited?
Jameson develops this impossibility to break out in his perspicuous
reading of the concept of positing
as the key to what Hegel means by
idealism. His first move is to dialectically mediate the very opposition of positing and presupposing:
The core of positing is not the direct
production of objects, since such a
production remains abstractly opposed to what is simply given. (I as
a finite subject finds in front of me
material objects and then proceeds
to positing by working on them.)
The core of positing concerns these
presuppositions themselves—that
is, what is primordially posited are
presuppositions themselves. Recall
Martin Heidegger’s notion of the
essence of modern technology as
Gestell: in order for the subject to
manipulate/exploit reality technologically, this reality has to be posited/presupposed (or, as Heidegger
puts it, disclosed) in advance as an
object of possible technological
exploitation, as a reserve of raw
materials and energies, etc. It is in
this sense that one should conceive
what is posited “in terms of presuppositions: for positing somehow
always takes place ‘in advance’ of
other kinds of thinking and other
kinds of acts and events” (27) or,
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even more pointedly, “in terms of
theatrical settings or pro-filmic
arrangements, in which, ahead
of time, a certain number of
things are placed on stage, certain
depths are calculated, and an optical center also carefully provided,
the laws of perspective invoked in
order to strengthen the illusion to
be achieved” (28):
Kant’s theory—phenomenon
and noumenon—looks somewhat different if it is grasped
as a specific way of positing
the world. . . . [I]t is no longer
a question of belief: of taking
the existence of objective reality, of the noumenon, of a
world independent of human
perceptions, on faith. But it is
also not a question of following in Fichte’s footsteps and
affirming that objective reality—the noumenon, which
has now become the not-I—
is summoned into being by
the primal act of the I, which
“posits” it (now using the
term in a metaphysical sense).
Rather, that beyond as
which the noumenon is
characterized now becomes
something like a category of
thinking. . . . It is the mind
that posits noumena in the
sense in which its experience of each phenomenon
includes a beyond along with
it. . . . The noumenon is not
something separate from the

phenomenon, but part and
parcel of its essence; and it is
within the mind that realities
outside or beyond the mind
are “posited.” (29)
We should introduce here a precise distinction between the presupposed/shadowy part of what appear
as ontic objects and the ontological
horizon of their appearing. On the
one hand, as it was brilliantly developed by Edmund Husserl in his
phenomenological analysis of perceptions, every perception even of
an ordinary object, involves a series
of assumptions about its unseen flip
side, as well as of its background;
on the other hand, an object always
appears within a certain horizon of
hermeneutic prejudices that provide an a priori frame within which
we locate this object and which
thus make the object intelligible—
to observe reality without prejudices means to understand nothing.
This same dialectic of positing the
presuppositions plays a crucial role
in our understanding of history:
[J]ust as we always posit the
anteriority of a nameless object along with the name or
idea we have just articulated,
so also in the matter of historical temporality we always
posit the preexistence of a
formless object which is the
raw material of our emergent social or historical articulation. (85–86)
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This formlessness should also be
understood as a violent erasure of
(previous) forms: whenever a certain act is posited as a founding one,
as a historical cut, the beginning of
a new era, the previous social reality is as a rule reduced to a chaotic
ahistorical conundrum—say, when
the Western colonialists “discovered” Black Africa, this discovery
was read as the contact of “prehistorical” primitives with civilized
history proper, and their previous
history basically blurred into formless matter. It is in this sense that the
notion of positing the presuppositions is “not only a solution to the
problems posed by critical resistance
to mythic narratives of origin . . . ; it
is also one in which the emergence
of a specific historical form retroactively calls into existence the hitherto formless matter from which
it has been fashioned” (87). This
last claim should be qualified or,
rather, corrected: what is retroactively called into existence is not
the hitherto formless matter but,
precisely, a matter that was well articulated before the rise of the new,
and whose contours were blurred,
became invisible, from the horizon of the new historical form—
with the rise of the new form, the
previous one is (mis)perceived as
“hitherto formless matter”; that is,
the formlessness itself is a retroactive effect, a violent erasure of the
previous form. (So what about
the obvious counterargument: the
abundance of ethnological studies
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of these prehistorical societies, with
detailed descriptions of their rituals, systems of kinship, myths,
etc.? The classic ethnology and
anthropology were precisely studies of “prehistoric” societies, studies
that systematically overlooked the
specificity of these societies, interpreting them as a contrast to “civilized” societies. Recall how, in their
description of the primitive myths
of origin, the early anthropologists
read, say, the statement that a tribe
originates from the owl, as a literal
belief [“They really believe their
predecessors were owls”], totally
missing the way such statements effectively functioned.) If one misses
the retroactivity of such positing of
presuppositions, one finds oneself
in the ideological universe of evolutionary teleology: an ideological
narrative thus emerges in which
previous epochs are conceived as
progressive stages/steps toward the
present “civilized” epoch. This is
why the retroactive positing of presuppositions is the materialist “substitute for that ‘teleology’ for which
[Hegel] is ordinarily indicted” (87).
(Marx’s aforementioned statement
about the anatomy of man offering the key to the anatomy of ape
should be read in the same way: as
the materialist reversal of teleological evolutionary progress.)
This Jamesonian account nonetheless raises a number of critical
points. Yes, presuppositions are
(retroactively) posited, but the conclusion to be drawn from this is not
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that we are forever caught into this
circle of retroactivity so that every
attempt to reconstruct the rise of
the New out of the Old is nothing but an ideological narrative.
Hegel’s dialectic itself is not yet another grand teleological narrative,
but precisely the effort to avoid
the narrative illusion of a continuous process of the organic growth
of the New out of the Old. The
historical forms that follow one
another are not successive figures
within the same teleological frame,
but successive retotalizations, each
creating (positing) its own past (as
well as projecting its own future).
In other words, Hegel’s dialectic
is the science of the gap between
the Old and the New, of accounting for this gap. More precisely, its
true topic is not directly the gap between the Old and the New, but its
self-reflective redoubling—when it
describes the cut between the Old
and the New, it simultaneously describes the gap, within the Old itself, between the Old-in-itself (as it
was before the New) and the Old
retroactively posited by the New.
It is because of this redoubled gap
that every new form arises as a creation ex nihilo: the Nothingness out
of which the New arises is the very
gap between the Old-in-itself and
the Old-for-the-New, the gap that
makes impossible the account of
the rise of the New in the terms of a
continuous narrative. (Marx himself was aware of this gap when,
in the last chapter of volume 1 of

Das Kapital, he used the narrative
of “so-called primordial accumulation” to confront the chaotic brutality of the actual rise of
capitalism.)
One should add a further qualification here: what escapes our grasp
is not the way things were before
the arrival of the New, but the very
birth of the New, the New as it was
“in itself,” from the perspective of
the Old, before the New managed
to posit its presuppositions. This is
why fantasy, the phantasmatic narrative, always involves an impossible gaze, the gaze by means of
which the subject is already present
at the scene of its own absence—the
illusion is here the same as that of
alternate reality whose otherness is
also posited by the actual totality,
which is why it remains within the
coordinates of the actual totality.
The way to avoid this utopian reduction of the subject to the impossible gaze witnessing an alternate
reality, from which he is absent, is
not to abandon the topos of alternate reality as such. Recall Walter
Benjamin’s notion of revolution as
redemption through repetition of
the past: apropos the French Revolution, the task of a true Marxist
historiography is not to describe
the events the way they really were
(and to explain how these events
generated the ideological illusions
that accompanied them); the task is
rather to unearth the hidden potentiality (the utopian emancipatory
potentials) that were betrayed in

	on jameson’s the hegel variations
the actuality of revolution and in its
final outcome (the rise of utilitarian
market capitalism). The point of
Marx is not primarily to make fun
of the wild hopes of the Jacobins’
revolutionary enthusiasm, to point
out how their high emancipatory
rhetoric was just a means used by
the historical cunning of reason to
establish the vulgar commercial
capitalist reality; it is to explain how
these betrayed radical-emancipatory potentials continue to insist
as kinds of historical specters that
haunt the revolutionary memory,
demanding their enactment, so
that the later proletarian revolution should also redeem (put to
rest) all of these past ghosts. These
alternate versions of the past that
persist in a spectral form constitute
the ontological openness of the historical process, as was clear to G. K.
Chesterton:
The things that might have
been are not even present
to the imagination. If somebody says that the world
would now be better if Napoleon had never fallen, but
had established his Imperial
dynasty, people have to adjust their minds with a jerk.
The very notion is new to
them. Yet it would have prevented the Prussian reaction;
saved equality and enlightenment without a mortal
quarrel with religion; unified Europeans and perhaps
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avoided the Parliamentary
corruption and the Fascist
and Bolshevist revenges. But
in this age of free-thinkers,
men’s minds are not really
free to think such a thought.
What I complain of is that
those who accept the verdict
of fate in this way accept it
without knowing why. By a
quaint paradox, those who
thus assume that history always took the right turning
are generally the very people
who do not believe there was
any special providence to
guide it. The very rationalists who jeer at the trial by
combat, in the old feudal ordeal, do in fact accept a trial
by combat as deciding all
human history.1
In his less-known Everlasting
Man (1926), Chesterton conducts
a wonderful mental experiment
along these lines, in imagining
the monster that man might have
seemed at first to the merely natural animals around him:
The simplest truth about
man is that he is a very
strange being; almost in the
sense of being a stranger on
the earth. In all sobriety, he
has much more of the external appearance of one bringing alien habits from another
land than of a mere growth
of this one. He has an unfair
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advantage and an unfair disadvantage. He cannot sleep
in his own skin; he cannot
trust his own instincts. He
is at once a creator moving
miraculous hands and fingers and a kind of cripple.
He is wrapped in artificial
bandages called clothes;
he is propped on artificial
crutches called furniture. His
mind has the same doubtful
liberties and the same wild
limitations. Alone among
the animals, he is shaken
with the beautiful madness
called laughter; as if he had
caught sight of some secret
in the very shape of the universe hidden from the universe itself. Alone among the
animals he feels the need of
averting his thought from
the root realities of his own
bodily being; of hiding them
as in the presence of some
higher possibility which creates the mystery of shame.
Whether we praise these
things as natural to man or
abuse them as artificial in nature, they remain in the same
sense unique.2
This is what Chesterton called
thinking backwards: we have to
put ourselves back in time, before
the fateful decisions were made or
before the accidents occurred that
generated the state that now seems
normal to us, and the royal way to

do it, to render palpable this open
moment of decision, is to imagine
how, at that point, history may
have taken a different turn. (This,
however, does not mean that, in a
historical repetition in the radical
Benjaminian sense, we simply return in time to the open moment
of decision and, this time, make the
right choice. The lesson of repetition is rather that our first choice
was necessarily the wrong one, and
for a very precise reason: the right
choice is only possible the second
time, after the wrong one; that is, it
is only the first wrong choice that
creates the conditions for the right
choice. The notion that we might
have made the right choice already
the first time, and that we just accidentally blew the chance, is a retroactive illusion.)
III
It is against this background that
one can raise two further critical
points about Jameson’s notion of
Understanding as an eternal and
unsurpassable form of ideology.
The first thing to note is that this
unsurpassable character is in itself
redoubled: first, there is Understanding as the a priori tendency
of human thinking toward identitarian reification; then, there is
the unsurpassability of the circle of
positing the presuppositions, which
prevents us from stepping outside
ourselves to grasp the not-I in all its
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forms, spatial and temporal (from
outside reality as our own historical past is independent of us). The
first critical point to be made here is
that the features Jameson attributes
to Understanding (“common-sense
empirical thinking of externality,
formed in the experience of solid
objects and obedient to the law of
non-contradiction”) clearly are historically limited: they designate the
modern/secular empiricist common sense very different from, say,
a primitive holistic notion of reality
permeated by spiritual forces.
However, a much more important critical point concerns the way
Jameson formulates the dichotomy
between Understanding and Reason: Understanding is understood as
the elementary form of analyzing,
of drawing the lines of fixed differences and identities; that is, of
reducing the wealth of reality to an
abstract set of features. This spontaneous tendency toward identitarian
reification has to be then corrected
by dialectical Reason, which faithfully reproduces the dynamic
complexity of reality by way of
outlining the fluid network of relations within which every identity
is located. This network generates
each identity and, simultaneously,
causes its ultimate downfall. . . .
This, however, is emphatically not
the way Hegel conceives the difference between Understanding
and Reason—let us read carefully a
well-known passage from the foreword to Phenomenology:
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To break up an idea into its
ultimate elements means returning upon its moments,
which at least do not have
the form of the given idea
when found, but are the immediate property of the self.
Doubtless this analysis only
arrives at thoughts which are
themselves familiar elements,
fixed inert determinations.
But what is thus separated,
and in a sense is unreal, is
itself an essential moment;
for just because the concrete
fact is self-divided, and turns
into unreality, it is something
self-moving, self-active. The
action of separating the elements is the exercise of the
force of Understanding, the
most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the
absolute power. The circle,
which is self-enclosed and
at rest, and, qua substance,
holds its own moments, is an
immediate relation, the immediate, continuous relation
of elements with their unity,
and hence arouses no sense
of wonderment. But that an
accident as such, when out
loose from its containing
circumference,—that what
is bound and held by something else and actual only by
being connected with it,—
should obtain an existence
all its own, gain freedom
and independence on its own
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account—this is the portentous power of the negative;
it is the energy of thought, of
pure ego. Death, as we may
call that unreality, is the most
terrible thing, and to keep
and hold fast what is dead
demands the greatest force
of all.3
Understanding, precisely in its
aspect of analyzing, tearing the
unity of a thing or process apart, is
here celebrated as “the most astonishing and greatest of all powers,
or rather the absolute power”—as
such, it is, surprisingly (for those
who stick to the common view of
dialectics), characterized in exactly
the same terms as Spirit which is,
with regard to the opposition between Understanding and Reason, clearly on the side of Reason:
“Spirit is, in its simple truth, consciousness, and forces its moments
apart.” Everything turns on how
we are to understand this identity and difference between Understanding and Reason: it is not
that reason adds something to the
separating power of Understanding, reestablishing (at some higher
level) the organic unity of what
Understanding has torn apart,
supplementing analysis with synthesis; Reason is, in a way, not
more but less than Understanding.
It is—to put it in Hegel’s wellknown terms of the dichotomy
between what one wants to say
and what one actually says—what

Understanding, in its activity, really
does, in contrast to what it wants/
means to do. Reason is therefore
not another facility supplementing
Understanding’s one-sidedness: the
very idea that there is something
(the core of the substantial content
of the analyzed thing) that eludes
Understanding, a transrational Beyond out of its reach, is the fundamental illusion of Understanding.
In other words, all we have to do to
get from Understanding to Reason
is to subtract from Understanding
its constitutive illusion—Understanding is not too abstract/violent;
it is, on the contrary, as Hegel put
it a propos Kant, too soft toward
things, afraid to locate its violent
movement of tearing things apart
into things themselves.4 In a way, it
is epistemology versus ontology: the
illusion of Understanding is that its
own analytic power—the power to
make “an accident as such, when
out loose from its containing circumference,—that what is bound
and held by something else and actual only by being connected with
it,—. . . obtain an existence all its
own, gain freedom and independence on its own account”—is only
an abstraction, something external
to true reality that persists out there
intact in its inaccessible fullness.
In other words, it is the standard
critical view of Understanding
and its power of abstraction (that
it is just an impotent intellectual
exercise missing the wealth of reality) that contains the core illusion
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of Understanding. To put it in yet
another way, the mistake of Understanding is to perceive its own
negative activity (of separating,
tearing things apart) only in its
negative aspect, ignoring its positive (productive) aspect—Reason is
Understanding itself in its productive aspect.5
IV
Even Jameson succumbs to this
classical anti-Hegelian topic when
he identifies narcissism as that
which “may sometimes be felt to be
repulsive in the Hegelian system as
such” (130) or, in short, as the central weakness of Hegel’s thought
expressed in his claim that reason should find itself in the actual
world:
We thereby search the whole
world, and outer space, and
end up only touching ourselves, only seeing our own
face persist through multitudinous differences and forms
of otherness. Never truly to
encounter the not-I, to come
face to face with radical otherness (or, even worse, to find
ourselves in an historical dynamic in which it is precisely
difference and otherness
which is relentlessly being
stamped out): such is the dilemma of the Hegelian dialectic, which contemporary
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philosophies of difference
and otherness seem only able
to confront with mystical
evocations and imperatives.
(131)
Instead of trying to undermine or overcome this narcissism
from the outside, emphasizing
the preponderance of the objective (or that the Whole is the nontrue and all other similar motifs
of Theodore Adorno’s rejection of
identitarian idealism), one should
rather problematize the figure of
Hegel criticized here by way of
asking a simple question: which
Hegel is our point of reference
here? Do not Georg Lukács and
Adorno both refer to the idealistsubjectivist (mis)reading of Hegel,
to the standard image of Hegel as
the absolute idealist who asserted
Spirit as the true agent of history,
its Subject-Substance? Within this
framework, capital can effectively
appear as a new embodiment of the
Hegelian Spirit, an abstract monster that moves and mediates itself,
parasitizing upon the activity of
actually existing individuals. This
is why Lukács also remains all too
idealist when he proposes to simply
replace the Hegelian Spirit with the
proletariat as the Subject-Object
of History: Lukács here is not really Hegelian, but a pre-Hegelian
idealist.
If, however, one problematizes this presupposition shared
by Lukács and Adorno, another
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Hegel appears, a more materialist
Hegel for whom reconciliation between Subject and Substance does
not mean that the subject swallows its substance, internalizing it
into its own subordinate moment.
Reconciliation rather amounts to a
much more modest overlapping or
redoubling of the two separations:
the subject has to recognize in its
alienation from the Substance the
separation of the Substance from
itself. This overlapping is what is
missed in the Feuerbach-Marxian
logic of de-alienation in which the
subject overcomes its alienation by
recognizing itself as the active agent
who itself posited what appears to
it as its substantial presupposition.
In the Hegelian reconciliation between Subject and Substance, there
is no absolute Subject that, in total
self-transparency, appropriates or
internalizes all objective substantial
content. But “reconciliation” also
doesn’t mean (as it does in the line of
German idealism from Hölderlin
to Schelling) that the subject should
renounce its hubris of perceiving
itself as the axis of the world and
accept its constitutive decentering,
its dependency on some primordial
abyssal Absolute that is beyond/
beneath the subject/object divide
and, as such, also beyond subjective
conceptual grasp. The subject is not
its own origin: Hegel firmly rejects
Fichte’s notion of the absolute I that
posits itself and is nothing but the
pure activity of this self-positing.
But the subject is also not just a

secondary accidental appendix/
outgrowth of some presubjective
substantial reality: there is no substantial Being to which the subject
can return, no encompassing organic Order of Being in which the
subject has to find its proper place.
Reconciliation between subject and
substance means the acceptance of
this radical lack of any firm foundational point: the subject is not its
own origin, it comes second, it is
dependent upon its substantial presuppositions; but these presuppositions also do not have a substantial
consistency of their own but are always retroactively posited.
What this also means is that
Communism should no longer be
conceived as the subjective (re)appropriation of the alienated substantial content—all versions of
reconciliation as “subject swallows
the substance” should be rejected.
So, again, reconciliation is the full
acceptance of the abyss of the desubstantialized process as the only
actuality there is: the subject has no
substantial actuality, it comes second, it only emerges through the
process of separation, of overcoming of its presuppositions, and these
presuppositions are also just a retroactive effect of the same process
of their overcoming. The result is
thus that there is, at both extremes
of the process, a failure/negativity
inscribed into the very heart of the
entity we are dealing with. If the
status of the subject is thoroughly
processual, then it emerges through
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the very failure to fully actualize itself. This brings us again to one of
the possible formal definitions of
subject: a subject tries to articulate
(express) itself in a signifying chain,
this articulation fails, and by means
and through this failure, the subject
emerges; the subject is the failure of
its signifying representation—this
is why Lacan writes the subject of
the signifier as ”, as “barred.” In a
love letter, the very failure of the
writer to formulate his declaration
clearly and efficiently, his oscillations, the letter’s fragmentation,
etc., can in themselves be the proof
(perhaps the necessary and the only
reliable proof) that the professed
love is authentic—here, the very
failure to deliver the message properly is the sign of its authenticity. If
the message is delivered smoothly,
it arouses suspicions that it is part
of a well-planned approach, or that
the writer loves himself, the beauty
of his writing, more than his love
object; that is, that the object is effectively reduced to a pretext for
engaging in the narcissistically satisfying activity of writing.
And the same goes for substance: substance is not only always already lost but comes to be
only through its loss, as a secondary return-to-itself—which means
that substance is always already
subjectivized. In reconciliation between subject and substance, both
poles thus lose their firm identity. Let us take the case of ecology: radical emancipatory politics
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should aim neither at the complete
mastery over nature nor at the humanity’s humble acceptance of the
predominance of Mother Earth.
Rather, nature should be exposed
in all its catastrophic contingency
and indeterminacy, and human
agency assumed in the whole unpredictability of its consequences—
viewed from this perspective of the
“other Hegel,” the revolutionary
act no longer involves as its agent
the Lukácsian substance-subject,
the agent who knows what it does
while doing it.
Apropos Hegel’s reconciliation
in a modern postrevolutionary
state, Jameson proposes the outlines of a higher-enlarged version
of the Hegelian reconciliation, a
version appropriate for our global
capitalist epoch: the project of a
human age characterized by production-for-us (the end of classes)
and ecology (113–15). Jameson’s
view is that, far from standing for
the ultimate end of history, the reconciliation proposed at the end of
the chapter on Spirit in Phenomenology is a temporary fragile synthesis—Hegel himself was aware that
this reconciliation is threatened, as
is clear from his panicky reaction to
the revolution of 1830 and the first
signs of universal democracy. (Recall his furious rejection of the British electoral Reform Bill, the first
step toward universal elections.)
Is it then not consequent that, in
view of the new contradictions of
the nineteenth-century capitalist
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system that exploded the fragile Hegelian synthesis, a renewed
Hegelian approach that remains
faithful to the idea of concrete universality, of universal rights for all,
“calls in its very structure for the
subsequent enlargements of later
history” (115) and for a new project
of reconciliation? Such a move is
nonetheless illegitimate: it doesn’t
take into account radically enough
that the same paradox as that of
the retroactive positing of presuppositions holds also for the future.
Let us take the case of a nation: to
paraphrase an old critic of Ernest
Renan, a nation is a group of people
united by a mistaken view about
the past, a hatred of their present
neighbors, and dangerous illusions
about their future. (Say, today’s Slovenes are united by the myths about
a Slovene kingdom in the eighth
century, their hatred of [at this moment] Croats, and the illusion that
the Slovenes are on their way to
become the next Switzerland.) Each
historical form is a totality that encompasses not only its retroactively
posited past but also its own future,
a future that is by definition never
realized: it is the immanent future
of this present, so that, when the
present form disintegrates, it undermines also its past and its future.
This is why Hegel was right to
insist that the owl of Minerva takes
off only at dusk; and this is why the
standard Communist project was
utopian precisely insofar as it was

not radical enough; that is, insofar
as, in it, the fundamental capitalist thrust of unleashed productivity
survived, deprived of its concrete
contradictory conditions of existence. The insufficiency of Heidegger, Adorno, and Horkheimer,
etc., resides in their abandonment
of the concrete social analysis of
capitalism: in their very critique or
overcoming of Marx, they in a way
repeat Marx’s mistake—like Marx,
they perceive the unleashed productivity as something ultimately
independent of the concrete capitalist social formation. Capitalism and
Communism are not two different
historical realizations, two species,
of instrumental reason—instrumental reason as such is capitalist,
grounded in capitalist relations, and
“really existing Socialism” failed because it was ultimately a subspecies
of capitalism, an ideological attempt
to have a cake and eat it, to break
from capitalism while retaining
its key ingredient. In other words.
Marx’s notion of the Communist
society is itself the inherent capitalist fantasy; that is, a phantasmatic
scenario for resolving the capitalist
antagonism he so aptly described. In
other words, our wager is that, even
if we remove the teleological notion
of Communism (the society of the
fully unleashed productivity) as the
implicit standard by which Marx, as
it were, measures the alienation of
the existing society, the bulk of his
critique of political economy, the
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insight into the self-propelling vicious cycle of capitalist (re)production, survives.
The task of today’s thought is
thus double: on the one hand, how
to repeat the Marxist critique of
political economy without the utopian/ideological notion of Communism as its inherent standard; on
the other hand, how to imagine effectively breaking out of the capitalist horizon without falling into the
trap of returning to the eminently
premodern notion of a balanced,
(self-)restrained society (the preCartesian temptation to which most
of today’s ecology succumbs).
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Notes
1. G. K. Chesterton, “The Slavery of the
Mind” (1929), www.basilica.org/pages/
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ebooks/G.K.Chesterton-The Thing.pdf
(accessed 8 July 2011).
2. G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting
Man (1926), www.worldinvisible.com/
library/chesterton/everlasting/content.
htm (accessed 8 July 2011).
3. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit,
trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), 18–19.
4. There is a wonderfully vulgar Jewish
joke about a Polish-Jewish wife, tired
after a hard day’s work, when her husband comes home, also tired but horny,
telling her, “I cannot make love to you
now, but I need a release—can you suck
me and swallow my sperm, this would
help me a lot!” The wife replies, “I am
too tired to do that now, darling—why
don’t you just masturbate and finish in
a glass, and I will drink it in the morning!” Does not this wife—contrary to
the cliché about the holistic-intuitive
reasoning of women as opposed to the
masculine rational analysis—provide an
example of the ruthless feminine use of
Understanding, of its power to separate
what naturally belongs together?
5. In a strict homology to this Hegelian
logic, it is meaningless to demand that
psychoanalysis be supplemented by
psychosynthesis, reestablishing the
organic unity of the person shattered by
psychoanalysis: psychoanalysis already
is this synthesis.

